Contents
Introduction
Brigitte Dormont
1. Hospital Quality Competition : A Review of the theoretical Literature
Brekke K. R., Gravelle H., Siciliani L., and Straume O. R.
2. Ownership and Hospital Productivity
Dormont B. & Milcent C.
3. Hospital Competition, Quality, and Expenditures in the US Medicare Population
Colla C., Bynum J., Austin A., and Skinner J.
4. The Competition Effect of o French Reform on Hospital Quality
Gobillon L., and Milcent C.
Comments
Pita Barros P. and Magnussen J.
Glossary
Authors
Résumé
La concurrence entre hÎpitaux peut-elle affecter la qualité des soins ?
Ă la suite des Ătats-Unis, la plupart des pays europĂ©ens ont rĂ©formĂ© leurs hĂŽpitaux au dĂ©but des annĂ©es 2000 avec un nouveau systĂšme de tarification visant Ă accroitre lâefficience dans la dĂ©livrance des soins. Ces rĂ©formes ont introduit une forte pression sur les hĂŽpitaux afin quâils rĂ©duisent leurs coĂ»ts. Câest pourquoi leur mise en Ćuvre peut susciter soulever des inquiĂ©tudes sur la qualitĂ© des soins. Une solution est dâencourager une concurrence en qualitĂ© entre les hĂŽpitaux.
Le but de cet ouvrage est de prĂ©senter les rĂ©sultats thĂ©oriques et empiriques concernant lâimpact de la concurrence sur la qualitĂ© des soins hospitaliers. Les contributions ici rassemblĂ©es Ă©manent dâĂ©conomistes universitaires qui sont les meilleurs spĂ©cialistes du sujet au niveau international. Ils sâintĂ©ressent aux questions suivantes : intensifier la concurrence Ă prix fixe entre les hĂŽpitaux conduit-il Ă une meilleure qualitĂ© des soins ? Les objectifs ou le statut â public ou privĂ© â des hĂŽpitaux peuvent-ils modifier lâimpact de la concurrence ? Doit-on attendre un impact identique quel que soit le cas ou la maladie traitĂ©s ? Est-il pertinent dâintroduire de la concurrence entre des hĂŽpitaux qui ont des cahiers des charges diffĂ©rents ?
Synopsis
Competition between Hospitals: Does it Affect Quality of Care?
Following the example of the United States, most European countries reformed their hospital regulations in the early 2000s, with the introduction of a new payment system aimed at encouraging efficiency in care delivery. Because they put strong pressure on hospitals to lower their costs, wide implementation of these reforms raised concerns for some about quality of care. One solution has been to encourage quality competition among hospitals.
The purpose of this volume is to bring together relevant theoretical and empirical results regarding the impact of hospital competition on the quality of care. Contributions come from academic economists recognized as the best specialists of the topic worldwide. They address the following questions: Does more intense competition among hospitals operating under fixed price systems always result in improved quality of care? Do hospital objectives and/or ownership matter? Is the impact identical for different diseases? Is it appropriate to introduce competition among hospitals with different mandates?